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Abstract
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with sticky prices are prominent in recent
research on macroeconomic ￿ uctuations. A main argument for these models is that they
have solid microfoundations. But staggered prices and wages are imposed exogenously. How
plausible are sticky prices and wages in these models? We show that, in a standard model,
staggered wage and price setting implies implausibly large reshu› ing of production and labor
supply on the microeconomic level. Furthermore, rationality is violated because households
sometimes end up with negative markups. Substantial ￿menu costs￿ are needed in order
to rationalize the assumed behavior. We present an alternative model with deep habits,
e¢ ciency wages, and ranking, which can generate a high degree of persistence without the
above mentioned problems.
1 Introduction
The issue whether models with staggered price and wage setting can create su¢ cient endogenous
output persistence has for long been a recurring theme in the literature. Currently popular DSGE
models are built on the paradigm of rational agents, but exogenous restrictions are imposed on
the timing of price and wage changes. Staggering of wages and prices plays an important role in
generating the desired amount of persistence. While the aggregate properties of these models are
quite well established, the microeconomic dynamics of staggered pricing models have received
little attention. This is both surprising and unfortunate, considering that the main argument for
using these models is that they have been explicitly derived from microfoundations.
1One can readily identify at least two reason to study the micro side of these models. First,
it should be of intrinsic interest to any researcher that agents in these models behave in a way
that appears approximately coherent with how agents behave in the real world. Second, since
the restriction on the frequency of reoptimization with respect to prices and wages is exogenous
and not an endogenous outcome of the maximization by agents, we must, in order to credibly
retain the assumption of rational agents, make sure that agents are still approximately rational
and that any deviation from rationality can be somewhat credibly explained.
The second issue has been pursued for simpler, static models by Akerlof & Yellen (1985),
Mankiw (1985), and Ball & Romer (1990), but has to our knowledge not been investigated in
a general equilibrium model of the kind that dominates the literature today. As these DSGE
models grow increasingly popular within the academic community as well as in central banks
worldwide, we think time calls for a reopening of this question.
In the ￿rst part of this paper we set up a simple version of the standard DSGE model with
sticky prices and wages. Like many others, we follow Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and
model households as monopolistic wage setters. We show that, for a standard calibration, agents
behave in a way that appears both empirically implausible and irrational. Quantities supplied
by ￿rms and labor supplied by households ￿ uctuate relative to the size of the shock in a manner
that appears highly counterfactual. The markup in the household sector often drops below zero,
violating the assumption that labor supply is voluntary. Furthermore, the loss that households
su⁄er when they cannot change their wages is substantial.
These problems arise because, in the standard model, ￿rms and households face very elastic
demand curves. A high elasticity of product demand is needed in order to generate a plausible
markup in the product market. A high elasticity of labor demand is needed in order to generate
su¢ cient sluggishness in wage-price adjustment, so that monetary shocks have persistent real
e⁄ects. But with staggered wages and prices, high elasticities imply very large quantity reallo-
cations during the adjustment after an aggregate shock. As a consequence, agents, who are late
to adjust their prices or wages after a shock, will end up procucing and working far away from
their desired levels.
In the second part of the paper we explore an alternative model of the supply side. Following
Ravn et al (2006) we introduce deep habits in the goods market. This allows for plausible
2markups without the implausibly large reshu› ing that occurs in the standard model. Following
Eriksson and Gottfries (2005) we model the labor market as a non-clearing market with e¢ ciency
wages, where ￿rms care about turnover and prefer to hire already employed workers. Such a
model can easily generate sluggish wage and price adjustment and highly persistent real e⁄ects
of monetary shocks. The reason is that when unemployed workers have di¢ culties competing
with employed workers for the jobs, unemployment has a relatively weak e⁄ect on wages. We
show that the losses that price- and wage-setting ￿rms su⁄er when they cannot change prices
and wages are smal in this alternative model.
2 A standard sticky price and wage DSGE model
In this section we set up a simple DSGE model and review its properties. We assume that both
prices and wages are sticky and can only be changed at predetermined intervals. The use of
sticky wages, in addition to sticky prices, has become predominant in the literature and appears
plausible considering how often wages are adjusted in the real world. Also, as will be discussed
below, ￿ exible wages imply, with a reasonable value of the labor supply elasticity, real wage
behavior which is inconsistent with empirical evidence.
2.1 Firms
We assume that there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers of intermediate
goods, indexed on the unit interval. A representative perfectly competitive ￿nal-good ￿rm com-
bines the intermediate goods to produce a homogenous consumption good. The ￿nal-good ￿rm
uses a constant returns to scale production technology:
Yt =
￿Z 1
j=0
Y
(￿￿1)=￿
jt dj
￿￿=(￿￿1)
; ￿ > 1 (1)
where Yjt is the input of intermediate ￿rm j at time t. The ￿nal-good ￿rm solves the following
problem:
max
Yjt
PtYt ￿
Z 1
j=0
PjtYjtdj (2)
3taking the price of the ￿nal good, Pt and the prices of intermediate goods, Pjt, as given. Manip-
ulating the ￿rst order condition, one obtains the ￿nal-good producer￿ s demand for intermediate
input:
Yjt =
￿
Pjt
Pt
￿￿￿
Yt (3)
The assumption of perfect competition in the ￿nal-good market implies zero pro￿ts and a ￿nal-
good price of
Pt =
￿Z 1
j=0
P
1￿￿
jt
￿1=(1￿￿)
(4)
which is naturally interpreted as the aggregate price index in the economy.
Intermediate-good producers operate a constant returns to scale technology:
Yjt = Njt (5)
where Njt is the labor rented by ￿rm j at time t.
Following Taylor (1980) prices of intermediate goods are assumed to be ￿xed for several
periods.1 Letting Np denote the duration of the price contract, the economy is divided into Np
ex ante identical cohorts of equal size, where ￿rms in each cohort are only allowed to reset their
prices every Np:th period. Intermediate-good ￿rm j:s price is reset at time t to maximize present
value of pro￿ts:
max
Pjt
Et
Np￿1 X
￿=0
(Pjt ￿ Wt+￿)Yjt+￿; (6)
subject to (3) and where Wt is the time t wage. The ￿rst order condition for the period t price
is given by:
1The use of Taylor contracts may seem somewhat unorthodox in light of the popularity of Calvo contracts in
the literature. From the perspective of microeconomic realism, however, we view Taylor contracts as the more
natural way of modeling price stickiness. Empirical studies usually ￿nd that both prices and wages are updated
at ￿xed intervals, consistent with the ￿xed duration contracts in the Taylor model. Also, the Taylor model is
more convenient for our purposes.
4Et
Np￿1 X
k=0
Yjt+k [(￿ ￿ 1)Pjt ￿ ￿Wt+k] = 0: (7)
The ￿rst order condition implies that the ￿rm￿ s relative price should be set as a markup over a
weighted average of future real marginal costs.
2.2 Households
Following Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), we assume that the economy is populated by a
continuum of monopolistically competitive households indexed on the unit interval. The prefer-
ence of the i:th household at time t is given by:
Uit = Cit ￿
1
￿
h
￿
it; ￿ > 1 (8)
where Cit is household i:s time t consumption and hit is hours worked. There are no means of
transferring resources over time and the household i:s time t budget constraint is given by:
Cit = ￿t +
Withit
Pt
(9)
where ￿t is the income from intermediate ￿rm pro￿ts at time t. All households are assumed to
own an equal number of shares in all ￿rms in the economy, hence the subscript identifying the
household is dropped from this variable.
Firms are assumed to employ units of composite labor that is composed of household-speci￿c
labor according to the labor aggregator:
Nt =
￿Z 1
i=0
h
(￿￿1)=￿
it di
￿￿=(￿￿1)
; ￿ > 1 (10)
where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated labor. This implies a demand for
household i:s labor at time t given by
hit =
￿
Wit
Wt
￿￿￿
Nt (11)
where Wit is household i:s wage at time t. The composite labor is sold at a price given by:
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￿ 1 R
i=0
W
1￿￿
it
￿1=(1￿￿)
(12)
The economy consists of Nw cohorts of households of equal size, each cohort setting their wage
for Nw periods. Household i:s optimal reset wage at time t is set to maximize present value of
utility:
max
Wit
Et
Nw￿1 P
￿=0
￿
Cit+￿ ￿
1
￿
h
￿
it+￿
￿
(13)
subject to (9) and (11). The ￿rst order condition for the time t wage is:
Et
Nw￿1 X
k=0
hit+k
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)
Wit+k
Pt+k
￿ ￿h
1=￿
it+k
￿
= 0 (14)
where ￿ = 1
￿￿1 is the labor supply elasticity. The ￿rst order condition implies that the real wage
should be set as a markup over a weighted average of future marginal values of leisure.
2.3 Aggregate demand
Modern empirical DSGE models are characterized by considerable nominal wage and price stick-
iness, and recent evidence suggests that demand-side shocks play a very important role in the
business cycle (see e.g. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007)). Thus, we focus in this paper
on the consequences of aggregate demand shocks. Monetary policy shocks are the most pure
demand shocks we can think of, and to keep the model simple, we close the model by assuming
a simple transactions technology
Yt =
Mt
Pt
(15)
where Mt is aggregate nominal balances at time t. Many shocks have direct e⁄ects on both
supply and demand, but to keep things simple, we consider a shock which, in itself, has no direct
e⁄ect on the supply side. Since there are no means of transferring resources intertemporally,
output must always be equal to consumption.
62.4 Calibration
There are three parameters that we need to calibrate: the labor supply elasticity ￿, the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods ￿ and the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent
kinds of intermediate labor ￿. As Kimball (1995) emphasizes, the labor supply elasticity is
not easy to estimate, and the calibration of this parameter has been subject to considerable
controversy in the literature. Consensus in the literature seems to be that the labor supply
elasticity can be at most unity, but is probably lower. Kimball (1995) claims that 1/3 is a
reasonable value and that a consumption-constant labor supply elasticity of about 1 is as high
as seems at all plausible. Romer (2001) uses 1/10 as benchmark value claiming that 1/3 is an
extreme value. We set ￿ = 1=3 in the baseline speci￿cation, but also consider the case of unit
elasticity as a sensitivity check.
With this value of the labor supply elasticity, we need wage stickiness. Stylized facts of
the business cycle suggest that the real wage is considerably less volatile than employment and
uncorrelated with the business cycle. In addition, evidence from vector autoregressions shows
very sluggish adjustment of both prices and wages following a monetary shock (Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). These observations are clearly at odds with a sticky price,
￿ exible wage model. If households are always on their labor supply curves, a one percent increase
in labor supply will increase the equilibrium real wage by 1=￿ percent. If ￿ = 1=3 the real wage
will be three times as volatile as output in response to a monetary policy shock. To be consistent
with empirical evidence of real wage and employment volatility we would need a value of ￿ well
above unity, which is clearly at odds with micro evidence concerning the labor supply elasticity.
This is why we need nominal wage rigidity in this model.
Most empirical studies ￿nd relatively modest markups, in the order of 10 percent (see e.g.
Basu and Fernald (1995)). We set ￿ = 10 which yields a markup factor of 10/9.
The parameterization of ￿ is a tricky business. Monopolistic households are hard to ￿nd
in the real world, so this parameter cannot be estimated on the microeconomic data. Lack-
ing empirically reliable evidence, wildly di⁄erent values are used in the literature. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) use ￿ = 21 and so do Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde
(2005), whereas Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) use ￿ = 4. We set ￿ = 10 because this
7is needed to generate su¢ cient endogenous persistence, i.e. a contract multiplier around 4.5.
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) we de￿ne the contract multiplier as the
ratio of endogenous persistence to exogenous persistence, i.e. the time for the output gap to be
closed divided by the contract length.2
We want to investigate the consequences of aggregate demand shocks which change output
by a plausible magnitude. As one would expect, monetary policy shocks seem to play a relatively
small role in the business cycle, but as discussed above, we view our monetary shock as a stand-
in for aggregate demand shocks in general. In the following, we consider the implications of a
2 percent demand-side shock. According to the evidence in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2007, Figure 6) and Smets and Wouters (2007), a demand-side shock of this magnitude is not
implausible .
2.5 Simulation results
In this section we present the quantitative properties of the model. The model is solved by
linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non stochastic, zero in￿ ation, steady state. We
quickly review the aggregate properties, then focus our attention on the adjustment on the
microeconomic level .
2.5.1 Aggregate properties
With 2 periods overlapping prices and wages our current parameterization yields a contract
multiplier of 4.5 in this model which appears consistent with empirical evidence.3 Assume for
instance that prices and wages are changed once a year, half in January and half in July. Then
the economy returns to steady state, following a monetary shock, after about 4.5 years.4
In a decentralized economy with uncoordinated price and wage setting, it is reasonable to
allow for more staggering. Suppose for instance that prices and wages are changed every year,
and every month 1/12 of the prices and wages in the economy are reset; in this case we get a
multiplier of about 4.4. This is consistent with the result in Chari, Kehoe McGratten (2000)
that persistence does not increase with the number of overlapping contracts.
2We de￿ne the outgap to be closed when less than 1 percent of the initial gap remains.
3See e.g. Walsh (2003)
4Taylor (1999) argues that both prices and wages are on averaged changed once a year.
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Figure 1: Impulse response of output, price level and the real wage when Np = Nw = 12.
As mentioned above, persistence crucially depends on ￿, setting e.g. ￿ = 5 decreases the
contract multiplier to 3.2 with 12 periods of overlapping. Persistence is essentially invariant to
perturbations in ￿.
In Figure 1 we plot the evolution of output, the price level and the real wage following a two
percent shock to money supply (the shock hits the economy in period 1) . The price level adjusts
slowly, broadly in line with evidence in VAR-studies. The real wage is very stable, peaking at
less than 0.1 percent above its steady state value. If we had assumed ￿ exible wages, the real
wage would, under the same parameterization, be three times as volatile as output, peaking at
3 percent above its steady state value. But when both prices and wages are sticky, and the
elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent kinds of labor is su¢ ciently high, we can generate an
adjustment pattern which is broadly in line with the impulse-responce patterns found in VARs.
2.5.2 Adjustment at the micro level
We now turn to the micro properties of the model developed above. In Figure 2 we plot the
response of prices, wages, and quantities supplied by ￿rms and households, with two period price
and wage stickiness. We see that the size of both price and wage changes are large relative to
the shock, especially in the ￿rst periods after the shock. In the ￿rst round of adjustments, the
￿rm which acts ￿rst increases its price so that almost half of the adjustment to the new steady
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Figure 2: Impulse response to ￿rms￿prices (top left panel) and quantaties (top right panel), and
households￿wages (bottom left panel) and labor (bottom right panel) when Np = Nw = 2.
state is completed; in the next period the remaining ￿rm increases its price so that more than
2/3 of the adjustment, of their price, to the new steady state is completed.
Substantial relative price changes lead to a striking reshu› ing of the quantities of goods and
labor supplied by individual ￿rms and households. The household that is unable to change its
wage in the period that the shock occurs, increases its labor supply by more than 6 percent in
that period; in the next period it reduces labor supply to nearly 2 percent below its original level.
If we assume that wages are reset once a year, so one period is six months, we get very large
￿ uctuations in the ￿rst year after the shock. Thus, while the aggregate adjustment in output is
smooth, the adjustment at the micro level is characterized by substantial oscillations.
This evolution of quantities is an inherent feature in a model with staggered price and wage
setting as the relative prices (wages) will shift depending on whose turn it is to reset the price
(wage). The degree to which changes in relative prices transmit into quantities depends on the
values of the elasticities of substitution, ￿ and ￿. But even if we set ￿ = 5; labor supply of those
unable to adjust, still increases by more than 4.5 percent in the period after the shock occurs,
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Figure 3: Impulse response to ￿rms￿prices (top left panel) and quantaties (top right panel), and
households￿wages (bottom left panel) and labor (bottom right panel) when Np = Nw = 12.
and drops below its original level in the following period. Increasing the value of ￿ naturally has
the opposite e⁄ect. Perturbations in ￿ have a similar e⁄ects on ￿rms.
Figure 3 plots prices and wages, and the quantities of good and labor supplied when there
are 12 periods (months) of both price and wage stickiness. The average price change is smaller
compared to the model with only two periods overlapping, but still, in the ￿rst round of adjust-
ments, even the smallest price changes are so large that almost 1/3 of the transition to the new
steady state is completed.
Compared with the previous case, the ￿ uctuations in quantities are considerably larger. Con-
sider the household that resets its contract last in the ￿rst round of adjustment, i.e. in period
12; in period 11 their labor supply will be more than 11 percent above the original steady state
level, dropping to almost 3 percent below in period 12. Thus while the evolution of aggregate
output is virtually independent of the amount of staggering, the evolution of quantities at the
micro level is not.
When contracts are reset they will be set so that expected average markup, over the duration
of the price or wage, is equal to the ￿ exible price markup. But even if the average markup is
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Figure 4: Variations in ￿rms￿(top panel) and households￿(bottom panel) actual markups, when
Np = Nw = 12.
constant there will be very large ￿ uctuations in the actual markup within the duration of the
price or wage contract. In the case with only two periods overlapping, half of the prices and
wages have been reset when the second and last price and wage is set; while in the model with 12
periods of overlapping, 92 percent of the prices and wages have been reset when the last prices
and wages are set. Since the evolution of the aggregate price level is roughly the same in both
models this means that the relative price of those about to adjust last in the 12 period model
must be much lower than in the 2 period model. This greater dispersion of relative prices is what
causes the extreme quantity dispersion visualized in ￿gures 2 and 3.
In terms of realism we believe that the case with 12 cohorts of price and wage setters is the
more plausible model of a decentralized economy where price and wage-setting is not coordinated.
Thus we consider this model to be the benchmark in the following.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the markups for households and ￿rms. The variation in
actual markups is much larger for households than for ￿rms. The reason is that there are
small movements in the real wage and hence ￿rms￿marginal costs are relatively unresponsive to
aggregate demand (c.f. Figure 1). For households, the marginal disutility of work increases if
they have to work more because they cannot change their wages, so the actual markup falls.
In our view there are two major problems with this model. The ￿rst concerns the realism
12of the model. We ￿nd it hard to believe that this adjustment process is anything like what is
happening in real world labor and product markets. The second problem concerns the rationality
of this behavior. There are two ways in which the microeconomic dynamics in this model is
inconsistent with rationality.
First, households are assumed to always satisfy the demand for labor at their current wage,
but large ￿ uctuations in labor input are associated with large ￿ uctuations in the marginal value
of leisure. The labor market markup is 10/9, which implies that a decrease in the markup of more
than 10 percent will make the markup become negative, making it undesirable for households
to satisfy labor demand at the current wage. As the bottom panel of Figure 4 shows, this lower
limit for the markup is reached much of the time during the adjustment to the shock, implying
that households are unwilling to supply labor at the given wage. So for a shock of reasonable
magnitude, the outcome is inconsistent with trade in the labor market being voluntary. A rational
household would refuse to work as much as demanded by ￿rms.
The second way in which the model is inconsistent with rationality has to do with how large
losses price and wage setters su⁄er as they are unable to adjust to aggregate demand shocks. As
discussed in the introduction, the popularity of modern sticky-price DSGE models stems from
the notion that these models have better microeconomic foundations compared to macro models
of earlier generations. But to make this claim we need to be able to rationalize price and wage
stickiness by alluding to "menu costs" of a reasonable magnitude.
The loss from price rigidity is a function of the deviation of the actual markup from the
￿ exible price markup and has traditionally been calculated for price setters. However considering
the large ￿ uctuations in the markup that households face in this model, it appears at least as
important to calculate the loss for the wage setters. Let stars denote their optimal prices and
quantities and let ￿F
jt and ￿H
it be the time t loss to ￿rm j and household i respectively. Measured
in terms of real pro￿ts and consumption, the time t losses to ￿rms and households from having
the wrong prices and wages are implicitly de￿ned by:
￿(P￿
t =Pt;Wt=Pt) = ￿(Pjt=Pt;Wt=Pt) + ￿F
jt (16)
U(L￿
t;C￿
t ) = U(Lit;Cit + ￿H
it) (17)
13Since there are many ￿rms and households there will be a distribution of losses at each
point in time. However, if we view the staggering of contracts as a Nash equilibrium no agent
should, for a reasonable menu cost, want to deviate and change the price or wage. Adopting
this perspective we only need to care about the largest loss any single agent faces. As it turns
out, the ￿rm/household which is last to adjust its price/wage after the shock is the one who
makes the largest loss. The dotted lines in Figure 5 show the losses, period by period, from
not having the optimal price/wage after a 2 percent demand shock. Firm losses are expressed
as a fraction of initial revenue and household losses as a fraction of initial consumption. We
see that the loss is largest in period 11, when all other cohorts have adjusted. Firm losses
reach a maximum of about 0.05 percent of revenue, but as conjectured above, the losses for
households are considerably larger than for ￿rms. They reach a maximum of about 1.8 percent
of consumption.
How large are the menu costs needed to support this behavior as an equilibrium outcome? To
make this question precise, we reformulate it as follows: How much would the ￿rm/household be
ready to pay in order to change its price one extra time during the adjustment to the shock? In
period 11 the household would be ready to pay 1.8 percent of initial consumption. But it would
be ready to pay even more in order to adjust its wage in period 10 because then it would bene￿t
from the extra wage change during two periods. The solid line in Figure 5 shows how much the
￿rm/household, which is to change its wage in period 12, is ready to pay to adjust its wage one
extra time in period 2, 3, 4, etc. Firm losses reach a maximum of 0.15 percent of initial revenue.
There may be menu costs large enough to prevent price adjustment in this case. But household
would be willing to pay 6.6 percent of initial (monthly) consumption to make one extra wage
adjustment in period 3. Hence we conclude that substantial menu costs are needed to support
an equilibrium with sticky wages.
Both ￿rm and household losses are insensitive to the value of ￿; but the value of ￿ is essential
for the results. If ￿ = 5 the maximum loss for households reaches 2.75 percent of initial consump-
tion in period 2. As discussed above ￿ = 5 implies substantially less endogenous persistence. If
￿ = 21 the household￿ s maximum loss reaches 16.5 percent of initial consumption in period 4.
A high value of ￿ means that a smaller wage change is necessary to restore the desired markup,
hence persistence increases. But it also makes deviations from the optimal price more costly as
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Figure 5: Loss of not changing the price (top panel) and not changing the wage (bottom panel)
when Np = Nw = 12.
even small variations in the relative price will induce large and costly variations in hours.
To conclude, both ￿rms and households behave in a way that appears highly unrealistic and
the behavior of households also appears to be irrational. For shocks of moderate size, sticky
prices appear to be near-rational.
2.6 Extensions
The most commonly used model of price stickiness is the Calvo model. This model is concep-
tually very similar to the Taylor model, but it has the odd feature that some unlucky ￿rms and
households will be stuck with the same prices and wages for years. Obviously, such ￿rms and
households would incur larger losses from price and wages rigidity compared to those which arise
in our Taylor model, thus reinforcing the arguments made above. We used the Taylor model both
because we ￿nd it more plausible than the Calvo model and because it is analytically simpler for
our purposes to have the dates of price and wage changes ￿xed rather than stochastic.
As discussed above, we think of the monetary shock as a representative of various demand
side shocks. Many shocks have direct e⁄ects on both supply and demand. A preference shock,
for example, which makes consumers more impatient, would increase consumption demand but
also reduce desired supply of labor. This would strengthen our arguments. The household which
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Figure 6: The case when the elasticity of substitution is equal to one. Wages (top panel), hours
worked (middle panel) and actual markups (bottom panel).
is last to change its wage would be forced to work much more although it would desire to work
less, so the deviation from desired labor supply (and markup) would be even larger. The same
is true if a boom arises because households become more optimistic about the future. A shock
to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment, will have small supply side e⁄ects in the short run and
hence be similar to the monetary shock.
We have abstracted from capital. With a quasi-￿xed capital stock, and rising marginal costs
for given wages, ￿rms￿losses from price rigidity would have been larger.
As discussed above, the elasticity of substitution of labour supply is a controversial parameter.
Figure 6 shows wages, hours and markup ￿ uctuations when the elasticity of substitution is unity.
As before, ￿ is set so that the contract multiplier is about 4.5, which in this case means a
somewhat lower value: ￿ = 9. (Persistence depends primarily on ￿ + ￿ so the change in lambda
is small when ￿ changes from 1/3 to 1.) In this case, households are more indi⁄erent to how many
hours they work, so the cost of wage rigidity is smaller. Now the maximum loss is 1.73 percent
of monthly consumption. But we still observe wild ￿ uctuations in hours worked depending on
when households change their wages. In this case, behavior may be considered near-rational, but
16the realism of the model is still highly questionable.
3 A model with unemployment, turnover and ranking
In the model presented above, menu costs must be substantial in order to support staggered
wages and prices as an equilibrium outcome. Since the marginal value of time increases with the
amount of labor supplied, households have strong incentives to change wages after a shock of
reasonable magnitude. This problem arises because all the adjustment occurs along the intensive
margin, i.e. by changing the number of hours per worker. There is, however, ample evidence
that most of the variation in labor input over the business cycle takes the form of variations in
the number of workers employed rather than hours per worker.
In this section we consider an e¢ ciency wage model with unemployment and wage-setting
￿rms, as suggested by Eriksson and Gottfries (2005), based on earlier ideas by Huizinga and
Schiantarelli (1992) and Blanchard and Diamond (1994). Workers either work a ￿xed amount or
they are unemployed, waiting for work. Employed workers can search on the job and turnover
is costly for ￿rms. In equilibrium, wages are set above the market clearing level so as to limit
turnover and employment is determined by labor demand. Firms have some preference for hiring
previously employed workers rather than unemployed workers, making it hard for unemployed
workers to compete for jobs (ranking). As a consequence, unemployment has a weak e⁄ect on
wages, and the adjustment after a shock is sluggish.
In addition, we assume that there are "deep habits" meaning that households prefer goods
that they consumed in the previous period. Following Ravn et.al. (2006) we assume that
habits are external to the individual household, thus preserving analytical tractability. With
this modi￿cation, a ￿rm￿ s demand is a function of last period￿ s demand, and the impact of the
relative price on demand is sluggish. The resulting demand speci￿cation is very similar to the
customer market model, and estimates from Gottfries (2002) and Lundin et.al (2007) are used to
calibrate the model. This modi￿cation eliminates the huge swings in ￿rms￿output observed in
the standard model. Also, small menu costs are su¢ cient to support staggered wages and prices
as an equilibrium outcome.
173.1 Households
Households consist of many workers who supply labor inelastically and are either employed or
unemployed. (Households only exist as a form of insurance arrangement in order to smooth
consumption between employed and unemployed workers.) Wages are set by ￿rms and unem-
ployed workers spend their time waiting for new jobs. There is no disutility of work and no
unemployment bene￿ts, so workers always prefer to be employed. We assume that a household
i:s time t utility is given by
Xit =
1 Z
0
"
￿Cijt
￿
Cjt￿1
Ct￿1
￿￿
￿
1
2
C2
ijt
Cit
#
dj: (18)
Here, ￿ represents the importance of habit. With a positive ￿, ￿rms prefer to consume goods
which they consumed to a great extent in the previous period. The household solves the following
problem:
max
Cijt
Xit (19)
subject to (18) and the budget constraint:
Iit =
1 Z
0
PjtCijtdj; (20)
where Iit is the household￿ s nominal income. This implies that demand for the good produced
by ￿rm j, is given by
Yjt =
￿
bjt ￿
Pjt
Pt
￿
Yt; (21)
where bjt depends on the lagged market share:
bjt = ￿
￿
Yjt￿1
Yt￿1
￿￿
(22)
and the appropiate price index is
Pt =
1
bt ￿ 1
1 Z
0
Pjtdj; (23)
18where bt ￿
1 Z
0
bjtdj.
3.2 Firms
Firms produce under constant returns to scale according to (5) and hire labor in an economy-wide
factor market. There is a hiring cost of cWt and ￿rms set both prices and wages..
At the beginning of a period, employed workers see the wage o⁄ered (promised) by their
current employer and decide whether to search for a new job. There are no search costs but, as
in Gottfries and Eriksson (2005), there are non-pecuniary aspects of a job, which a⁄ect utility,
and which vary randomly from period to period. Hence there will always be some workers who
are (temporarily) dissatis￿ed with the job and decide to look for another job. Let the fraction
of ￿rm j:s workers who apply for a new job be Sjt. The fraction of employed workers who look
for a new job depends on the ￿rm￿ s relative wage:
Sjt = Z
￿
Wjt
Wt
￿
: (24)
with Z0 < 0;Z00 > 0 when the relative wage is close to unity. By raising its relative wage, the ￿rm
can reduce the fraction of its workers who look for another job. In the numerical calculations we
specify this function as Z (Wjt=Wt) ￿ (Wjt=Wt)
￿￿ S0.
In addition, a fraction s of the workers quit to unemployment each period. We assume that
voluntary quits are large enough so that there are no layo⁄s even if a bad shock occurs. We
normalize the size of the average labor force per ￿rm to unity. Firms￿preference for hiring
already employed workers is modeled by and assuming that, to a fraction r of their job openings,
￿rms hire only employed applicants. We can now calculate the probability that an employed job
searcher ￿nds another job, at, as:
at = r
nt ￿ (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ Stat)nt￿1
(1 ￿ s)Stnt￿1
+ (1 ￿ r)
nt ￿ (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ Stat)nt￿1
1 ￿ (1 ￿ s)nt￿1 + (1 ￿ s)Stnt￿1
(25)
where St is the average search intensity across ￿rms in the economy. With probability r, the
employed worker applies to a job where he competes only with employed applicants, with prob-
ability 1 ￿ r he applies to a job where he competes with all applicants. In each period the ￿rm
19produces to satisfy demand and hires Njt ￿ (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ Z (Wjt=Wt)at)Njt￿1 workers.
Now consider the ￿rms￿price and wage setting problem. We assume that each ￿rm can only
change its price and wage every N:th period in accordance to the staggering structure described
above. The ￿rm sets Pjt and Wjt to maximize pro￿ts subject to (21). To faciliate this we form
the Lagrangian function
L = Et
1 X
￿=0
￿
￿
8
> <
> :
(Pjt+￿￿Wjt+￿)Yjt+￿ ￿ cWt+￿ [Yjt+￿ ￿ (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ Z (Wjt+￿=Wt+￿)at+￿)Yjt+￿￿1]
+￿jt+￿
￿￿
￿
￿
Yjt￿1+￿
Yt￿1+￿
￿￿
￿
￿
Yjt+￿
Yt+￿
￿￿
Pt+￿ ￿ Pjt+￿
￿
9
> =
> ;
;
(26)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the ￿rm￿ s subjective discount factor and ￿jt is the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the demand curve. The shadow price ￿jt measures the marginal increase in pro￿ts if
the ￿rm could raise its price without any negative e⁄ect on sales. The ￿rst order condition with
respect to the wage is:
Et
N￿1 X
k=0
￿
kYjt+k = ￿c(1 ￿ s)Et
N￿1 X
k=0
￿
kZ0
￿
Wjt+k
Wt+k
￿
at+kYjt+k￿1: (27)
This condition says that the increase in the wage bill from a marginal wage increase should be
equal to the decrease in hiring costs, due to lower turnover, brought about by the higher wage.
The ￿rst order condition for price setting is:
Et
N￿1 X
k=0
￿
kYjt+k = Et
N￿1 X
k=0
￿
k￿jt+k: (28)
This condition says that the marginal increase in the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, resulting from an increase
in the price, should be equal to the shadow price. Due to habit formation, ￿jt is a di⁄erence
equation, given by
￿jt =
￿
Pjt ￿ %jt
￿ Yt
Pt
+ ￿￿￿
￿
Yjt
Yt
￿￿￿1 Pt+1
Pt
￿jt+1; (29)
where %jt is the time t marginal cost:
%jt = Wjt + cWt ￿ c(1 ￿ s)Wt+1 (1 ￿ Z (Wjt+1=Wt+1)at+1): (30)
20A time t marginal increase in production requires additional workers to be hired, increases the
wage bill and, hiring costs, but also reduces hiring costs tomorrow.
3.3 Calibration
The period is one month and we chose parameter values to match the U.S. economy as in Eriksson
and Gottfries (2005); we refer to their paper for motivation and empirical references. Note that
S0 is the fraction searching on the job if there are no shocks. We set S0 = 0:042 and s = 0:015 to
match ￿ ows between jobs and between employment and unemployment, and c = 3 so the hiring
cost corresponds to one quarterly wage. We do not have independent evidence on In this model,
￿cZ0(1) is a measure of the wage pressure due to turnover costs, so the higher Z0(1) is the higher
is equilibrium unemployment. We set ￿cZ0(1) = 5:04 in order to get an unemployment rate of
7.5 percent. This means that Z0(1) = ￿1:68 (￿ = 40) i.e. a one percent wage increase reduces
job search by 4 percentage units. This big e⁄ect (or a higher hiring cost) is necessary in order for
wages not to fall when unemployment is 7.5 percent. Note, however, that we have disregarded
worker bargaining power, search frictions and other factors which put upward pressure on wages
and raise equilibrium unemployment. To obtain a reasonable amount of persistence in output,
we set r = 0:08: to 8% of the jobs, ￿rms hire only employed workers. In addition we set ￿ = 1:1
in line with estimates of market share dynamics in Gottfries (2002) and Lundin et al (2007), and
￿ = 0:9047 so that the steady markup is 10 percent and ￿ = 0:951=12.
3.4 Simulation results
We now turn to the quantitative properties of this model. First consider the case without
overlapping contracts but where prices and wages are set one period in advance. As shown in
Figure 7 a money shock has persistent e⁄ects. This occurs because unemployment has a weak
e⁄ect on wages. With one-period wage and price stickiness, a monetary shock raises output and
employment, but the resulting low employment has littel e⁄ect on wages. We now reintroduce
staggering by assuming 12 periods of overlapping prices and wages.
213.4.1 Aggregate properties
Figure 8 plots the aggregate dynamics in this model with staggering; we have a reasonable
amount of persistence.
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Figure 7: Aggregate dynamics without staggering.
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Figure 8: Impulse response of output, price level and the real wage when N = 12.
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Figure 9: Impulse response of ￿rms￿prices (top panel), wages (second panel), quantities (third
panel) and markups (bottom panel) when N = 12.
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Figure 10: The gain from an extra price/wage adjustment for a ￿rm belonging to cohort 12.
243.4.2 Adjustment at the micro level
In Figure 9 we plot the evolution of prices, wages, output and markups for the di⁄erent cohorts.
The average price increase during adjustment is smaller than in the standard model. After a
shock, there is low unemployment, but since unemployed workers do not compete well with
employed workers, the level of unemployment has a weak e⁄ect on desired wages. Hence ￿rms￿
incentives to change wages and prices are weak. Furthermore, the short run elasticity of demand
is very limited, and hence ￿rms￿outputs return to steady without the oscillations observed in
the standard model. Also, markups do not move much during the adjustment. Figure 10 shows
the increase in the discounted pro￿t stream, for a ￿rm belonging to cohort 12, if the ￿rm is
allowed to change its price/wage once, in period t = 1;2;::;11, prior to its scheduled adjustment.
Compared with the standard model (c.f. Figure 5) these numbers are much smaller, indicating
that the private costs of price and wage rigidity are small.
4 Conclusion
In a standard Taylor/Calvo model, the private cost of price/wage rigidity is high and there is
implausible reshu› ing of production and labor due to the asynchronized adjustment of prices
and wages. In a model with a non-clearing labor market, e¢ ciency wages, and ranking, the
incentives to change wages and prices are weak, wage-price adjustment is sluggish, and demand
shocks have very persistent e⁄ects. Also, the private costs of wage and price rigidity are small.
Furthermore, a model with deep habits (customer markets) eliminates the large reshu› ing of
production and workers which occurs in a standard New Keynesian model.
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5 Appendix
In the alternative model we assume that employed workers￿decisions to apply for another job
depends on the relative wage according to the function
Sjt = Z
￿
Wjt
Wt
￿
: (31)
with Z0 < 0;Z00 > 0. In this appendix we derive this functionextending slightly the argument
made in Eriksson and Gottfries (2005). We ￿rst consider the model without staggering and
27assume that an individual worker k in ￿rm j gets the wage
Wkjt = Wjt (1 + ￿kjt): (32)
where ￿kjt is independently distributed across time and individual workers with distribution
function G(￿kjt). We can think of ￿kjt as representing errors in the adjustment of wages to
quali￿cations and working times of individual workers, which is not explicitly modeled here. This
shock also includes nonpecuniary aspects which temporarily a⁄ect the utility that an individual
worker gets on the job. An already employed worker can see Wkjt in his current ￿rm at the
beginning of the period, and he has correct expectations about the general wage level Wt but
he ￿nds out ￿kjt in another ￿rm only after he has switched job. Searching on the job is costless
so a worker will look for another job, an take it if he gets an o⁄er, if he expects to gain from
switching jobs, i. e. if Wkjt = Wjt (1 + ￿kjt) < Wt, so the number of workers looking for another
job will be
Z
￿
Wjt
Wt
￿
= G
￿
Wt
Wjt
￿ 1
￿
: (33)
Note that, in equilibrium, all ￿rms set the same average wage Wt and a worker who observes a
higher wage will think that he had a temporarily high ￿kjt; hence he will have the same expected
utility from period t+1 onwards independent of whether he switches jobs or not. We assume that
the distribution of ￿kjt is unimodal and peaks at a positive value so that most workers prefer to
stay when wages are equal. It follows G is increasing and convex and that Z0 = ￿G0 (0) < 0 and
Z00 = G00 (0) + 2G0 (0) > 0 when Wjt = Wt.
When wages are staggered, forward-looking workers are extremely complicated to analyse.
In this case we simply assume that workers are myopic that they are subject to the same ￿kjt
shocks as above.
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